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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GLENN E. FULLER and
CONNIE J. FULLER,

]

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
|

No. 930367-CA

vs.
PRESTON E. BOWN, WILLIAM L. BOWN,
RONALD L. BOWN and JEFFREY C. BOWN,]
Defendants-Appellees.

]

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this
matter pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(1) Utah Code Annotated.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Were the findings of the trial court clearly erroneous?

2.

Were the conclusions of the trial court correct?

3.

Does the overlapping of a mineral filing claim upon

federal lands constitute slander of title to the overlapped
claim?
4.

Does a quiet title action provide any remedies or award

of damages for failure to timely release an alleged cloud on the
title?
1

5.

Is the appellee entitled to attorneys fees for frivolous

appeal under Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure?
6.

The remaining issues are stated by the appellant.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

To successfully challenge the trial court's findings the

appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous.
Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (March 1993).
2.

The appellate court reviews a trial court's conclusions

of law for correction of error. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
(a)

Utah Code Annotated § 78-40-1 to § 78-40-13 relative to

quieting title.
(b)

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33.

(c)

Utah Code Annotated § 40-1-2 relative to filing notice

of location of placer claims on federal lands.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Plaintiff-Appellant ("Fullers") commenced the action to
quiet title to a portion of their mineral claims and mill site
2

and for damages for slander of title.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court.

After a full bench trial and review of briefs filed by both
parties the trial court issued a memorandum decision together
with subsequent Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
dismissing the Fullers' complaint with prejudice with each party
bearing its own costs.
C.

Statement of Facts

Appellees submit the following excerpt from the trial
court's Findings of Fact as being the facts of the case:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Prior to September 14, 1991, Fullers were owners of

mining claims in Park Valley, Box Elder County, Utah, known as
Turquoise Stone Placer Mining Claim and Turquoise State Placer
Millsite Claim.

The defendants ("Bowns11) on or about April 2,

1990 filed a Notice of Location of a placer claim designated as
Boulder Haven #1 described as all of the West one half (1/2) of
the Northeast one fourth (1/4) of Section 18, Township 13 North,
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, an eighty (80) acre
claim which overlapped a portion of about five acres of the
Turquoise Stone Placer Millsite of the plaintiff in said quarter
section.

The defendant, William Bown, had previously observed a

plat on file with the Bureau of Land Management which did not
clearly show any of the Fullers7 mill site to be within the
eighty (80) acre filing of the Bowns's.

Bowns did not knowingly,

recklessly, maliciously, deliberately file the overlapping placer
3

claim with intention to slander the title of the Fullers' mill
site claim.

Bowns at no time took possession of the mill site

area or interfered with the use thereof.
2.

Bowns on May 18, 1992, filed a release with the Bureau

of Land Management of the Boulder Haven #1 placer claim, and on
August 10, 1992, delivered to Fullers an Abandonment And
Disclaimer of the said placer claim for recording in the office
of the Recorder of Box Elder County, Utah.
3.

The Fullers suffered no damages as a result of the

overlapping filing by the Bowns.
4.

No attorneys fees were paid or incurred by the Fullers

in connection with this proceeding, in that Glen E. Fuller
appeared and acted pro se.
Fullers' Statement of Facts includes some of the evidence
presented, however the Fullers have not undertaken their burden
of marshalling all the evidence to render the findings of the
trial court clearly erroneous.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The findings of the trial court must stand in absence of
marshalling of evidence which would show them to be clearly
erroneous.

The overlapping of the placer claim does not

constitute a cloud upon the title nor did it constitute slander
of title.

A quiet title action does not include the right of the

Fullers to demand damages or attorney fees.

The Bowns disclaimed

any interest in the overlap and the Fullers suffered no damages
4

therefrom.

Having insisted on pursuing the litigation after

disclaimer and demanding attorney fees where none is provided by
law, the Fullers pursued a frivolous claim below as well as
herein, and the Bowns should be entitled to an award of attorney
fees.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

FULLERS SUSTAINED NO RECOVERABLE DAMAGES.

Fullers sustained no recoverable damages.

Fullers sold the

claim prior to litigation at a substantial profit and they and
their buyer profited by intimidating the Bowns to release the
Bowns7 entire eighty (80) acre claim to eliminate only a five
acre overlap.

The buyer immediately filed a claim on the entire

eighty (80) acre tract vacated by the Bowns, thus receiving a
seventy-five (75) acre windfall.
Fullers are not entitled to damages in a suit to quiet
title.

As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Jack B. Parson

Companies v. Nieldr 751 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah 1988):
The trial court awarded damages against Nield for
refusing to "cleanse" title. The damages were based
upon the amount of interest Parson paid on its loan
from Bank of Utah while the title was held up. There
is no basis in law for this award. Quiet title actions
are statutory in nature, Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d
11, 327 P.2d 250 (1958), and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-40-1
through -13 (1987), authorizing quiet title actions,
does not include any remedies for refusing to release
title. Although Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-8 (1986) allows
damages when a mortgagee fails to discharge or release
a mortgage after it has been fully satisfied, Utah case
law renders that statute inapplicable to this factual
situation.
Both the applicability of section 57-3-8 and the
5

availability of damages for a refusal to "cleanse"
title are controlled by the holding in Draper v. J.B. &
R.E. Walker, Inc.P 115 Utah 368, 204 P.2d 826 (1949).
In Draper, the plaintiff was the owner of two tracts of
land that adjoined land owned by Old Mill Tavern, Inc.
After recording tax deeds to the plaintiff's property,
Old Mill Tavern commenced an action to quiet title to
the land. Before a decree was entered quieting title,
the owner of the tavern delivered a mortgage to
defendant Walker; the mortgage was filed thirteen
months before the district court held the tax deeds
invalid and quieted the title. The plaintiff requested
that the defendant release the mortgage once the decree
had been entered. When the defendant did not do so,
the plaintiff sued for damages. This Court held that
there was no affirmative duty to release the lien and
that "at the common law, no action for damages would
lie because of a refusal to release a mortgage or
discharge a lien or claim against property." Id. at
374, 204 P.2d at 829. Nor did section 57-3-8 (then
section 78-3-8) apply. The Court stated, "[The] scope
of the statute is clearly limited to the mortgageemortgagor relationship. . . . [T]he demand that the
release be executed was made by one who was not a
mortgagor upon one who had never occupied the position
of mortgagee to this plaintiff or any one [sic] in
privity with him." Id. at 375, 204 P.2d at 830.
POINT II. THIS CASE DID NOT INVOLVE FACTS WHICH CONSTITUTED
SLANDER OF TITLE NOR ANY CLOUD UPON THE TITLE OF FULLERS.
Fullers contend that junior filings of placer mining claims
on federal lands constitute slander of title to a senior placer
mining claim.

The filing of a Notice of Location of a placer

claim on federal land is provided in Utah Code Annotated § 40-12, and only requires a statement of the name of the claim, names
of locators, date of location, number of acres and "such a
description of the claim or mill site, located by reference to
some natural object or permanent monument, as will identify the
claim or mill site."

As stated in Crawford v. Gibbs 123 Utah

447, 260 P.2d 870, 871 (Utah 1953):
Prospectors are not engineers nor does the law expect
6

them to be. However, the law does require sufficient
detail and accuracy in the notice as recorded to allow
location of the claim upon reasonable effort.
The Crawford case involved typical conflicting claims arising in
the excitement to discover uranium ore. No one claimed slander
of title. Nor have we found any cases which hold that a junior
filing constitutes slander of title to a senior notice of
location of a placer mining claim or mill site.

In fact, in such

instances it is even anticipated that there will be senior and
junior locations.

In 54 Am Jur 2d 259, Mines and Minerals

Section 76, it is stated:
In other words, a relocation of land that at the time
is covered by a valid and subsisting location is wholly
void, not only as against the prior locator, but also
as against all the world; and neither succeeding
default by the original appropriator nor subsequent
discovery by the junior claimant can make it valid.
The section continues:
The principle stated does not conflict with the right
of a junior claimant to extend the boundaries of his
claim over, upon, or across a senior location, since
the benefits obtained thereby are in no way
inconsistent with those of the first locator.
Mr. Fuller filed a map with the BLM which did not show a place
claim in the Northeast quarter of Section 18, although he
subsequently filed a mill site claim for 5 acres in the Northeast
quarter which recites: "This millsite placer claim does not
include any land which is mineral in character. . . . "
Therefore, the Bown location for placer minerals would not
conflict with a mill site claim unless Bown interfered with
possession of the mill site —

which did not occur.

Accordingly, the filing by Bown of a notice of location of
7

placer claim in no way constitutes a claim of ownership of any
previous filings of Fuller for a mill site.

Bown has never

claimed any conflicting interest in Fuller's claims, and in fact,
William Bown was well acquainted with the principal person, Gary
Mullard in Northern Stone Supply, Inc., and suggested that
Mullard (not previously known to Fuller) contact Fuller to buy
the subject claims.

Mullard did contract to buy Fuller's claims

by agreement dated September 14, 1991.

Fuller benefited and

profited by Bown's recommendations and was not damaged by any
action of the defendants.

It is not as though the defendants

expressed in any way, by notices or otherwise, that they claimed
Fuller's mill site.

Fullers quoted only a part of Bown's

testimony and excluded the part which removed the implications
created by Fullers' underlining and editing portions of Bown's
testimony to give the reverse impression from that which was
apparent to the trial court.
OTHER UTAH CASES ON DESCRIPTIONS
An interesting case on the leniency afforded mineral
locators in their descriptions of claims is one in which Glen E.
Fuller was a plaintiff in Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture 6 Utah 2d
385, 314 P.2d 840 (Utah 1957).

It appears to involve property in

the vicinity of the subject controversy.

The Utah Supreme Court

was liberal in stating that Glen Fuller's procedure did not
include a survey but relied on his own sense of direction laying
out the claim partly by guesswork and in some instances by
stepping distances which the Court said was "a not unusual
8

practice in locating mining claims." The opinion makes many
references to the latitude allowed in descriptions such as
references to "a cedar tree", "a stone with a stick and a red
flag on it", "a large white rock with a cedar tree by it," etc.
The Court said that punctilious compliance is not an
indispensable prerequisite and that "the statutory rules are
subject to variance to meet practical exigencies confronted by
prospectors."
The Fuller case was cited for similar reasons in Powell v.
Atlas Corp. 615 P.2d 1225 (Utah 1980).
Under Utah Code Annotated § 40-1-4, within thirty (30) days
of the posting of notice upon the claim itself, the locator is to
file for record in the office of the county recorder, a
substantial copy of the notice of location.

However, such notice

of location "shall not be abstracted unless a subsequent
conveyance affecting the same property is filed for record,
whereupon it shall be abstracted."

There was no evidence that

either the Bown notice or the Fuller notice were ever abstracted
by the Box Elder County Recorder and the evidence was that such
notices were merely filed by the recorder and no plats or
abstracts were made.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW ON SLANDER OF TITLE
Section 623A of the Restatement of the Law of Torts Second
lists the elements for liability in the publication of injurious
falsehoods and Section 624 applies these elements to slander of
title to property.
9

§ 623A. Liability for Publication of Injurious
Falsehood— General Principle
One who publishes a false statement harmful to the
interests of another is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss resulting to the other if
(a) he intends for publication of the statement to
result in harm to interests of the other having a
pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should
recognize that it is likely to do so, and
(b) he knows that the statement is false or acts in
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.
§ 624. Disparagement of Property—Slander of Title
The rules on liability for the publication of an
injurious falsehood stated in § 623A apply to the
publication of a false statement disparaging another7s
property rights in land, chattels or intangible things,
that publisher should recognize as likely to result in
pecuniary harm to the other through the conduct of
third persons in respect to the other's interest in the
property.
Comment:
a. This Section is a special application of the
general principle as to the publication of an injurious
falsehood stated in § 623A, to which reference should
be made. The Comments to that Section are all
applicable here, so far as they are pertinent.
There was no evidence that the notice filed by Bown was
harmful to Fullers7 claim nor that Bowns filed their notice
intending harm.

The court found that Bowns "did not knowingly,

recklessly, maliciously, deliberately file the overlapping placer
claim."

Bowns7 notice was a rectangular eighty (80) acre tract

described as the west one-half of the northeast quarter of a
section and it happened to overlap five acres of Fullers7 mill
site claim which projected triangularly into that eighty (80)
acre filing.

In the filing of mineral claims the formalities of

an exact survey are not expected as was stated by the Court in
10

Crawford v. Gibbsf supra.
POINT III. FULLERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES.
The cases cited by Fuller allowing attorney fees for
quieting title are not relevant to the facts of this case, and if
relevant, an attorney acting pro se is not entitled to attorney
fees.

The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Smith v. Batchelor

832 P.2d 467 (Utah 1992) held that an attorney representing
himself pro so is not entitled to recover attorney fees even
where attorney fees would otherwise be proper.
Olsen v. Kidman, 235 P.2d 510 (Utah 1951) involved a filing
of a Notice of Lien by Kidman, a realtor, for a claimed
commission where no statutory provision for such lien existed.
Kidman actually claimed that he had a valid, equitable lien upon
plaintiff's real property.
attorney fees stating:

The opinion upheld the award of

"The court found that it was necessary

for the plaintiff to employ counsel for the purpose of removing
the lien. . . . "

Fullers did not employ counsel to pursue the

instant litigation.
In Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 208 P.2d 956 (Utah 1949), the
defendant, Doris, recorded a document claiming that Dowse had
purchased a designated tract as agent for Doris, and thus
prevented Dowse from selling the tract.

The opinion states:

"Defendant
did not deny that he placed the instrument on record knowing that
he did not have an enforceable contract to buy the land for the
purpose of preventing plaintiff from mortgaging or selling it."
11

The Bown trial court properly found that Bowns had not
slandered the title to Fullers' claims. Accordingly, there was
no basis for an award of attorney fees because in absence of
statute, contract, or rule of law providing for attorney fees,
none should be awarded.

Ouin v. Ouinf 830 P.2d 282, 284 (Utah

App. 1992).
Assuming that attorney fees were otherwise indicated in this
case, the holding of Smith v. Batchelor is the law of the case in
denying a pro se attorney from recovering fees.

Nor does

Fullers' claim to attorney fees qualify as "costs." As stated in
Tholen v. Sandy City. 208 Adv. Rep. 75, 77 (Utah App. 1993), "In
Utah attorney's fees are awardable only if authorized by statute
or contract. . . . Moreover, attorney's fees should not be
confused with the more generic term "costs" because without
specific statutory language, costs do not include attorney's
fees."

CONCLUSION
The judgment of dismissal of the action with prejudice
should be affirmed and the respondent should be awarded attorney
fees on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

'George K. Fadel
Attorney for Appellant.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I mailed two copies of Brief of Defendants-Appellees to Glen
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